It's May 2026, and the Italian Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee is advancing a revised electoral law proposal that could reshape how future governments are formed. The ruling center-right coalition is now targeting a 42% vote threshold to trigger a majority bonus designed to guarantee stable governing majorities in the next general election, expected in 2027.
The proposal—dubbed the "Bignami-bis" or "Stabilicum"—represents a second iteration of legislation first introduced by Galeazzo Bignami, the Fratelli d'Italia group leader in the Chamber of Deputies. The updated draft incorporates changes negotiated during high-level meetings at Palazzo Chigi, the seat of the Italian government, and is expected to serve as the baseline text for upcoming amendments once general debate concludes.
Why This Matters:
• Threshold raised: The coalition has increased the minimum vote share needed for the majority prize from 40% to likely 42%, making it harder to trigger the bonus.
• Seat cap lowered: The maximum number of Chamber seats a coalition can obtain through the bonus drops from 230 to approximately 220-222 seats, though the fixed prize remains 70 deputies and 35 senators.
• Proportional fallback: If election results differ between the Chamber and Senate, seats will be allocated purely proportionally with no bonus applied.
• Runoff eliminated: The proposed second-round ballot mechanism has been scrapped entirely.
What Is the Rosatellum?
To understand what's changing, it helps to know the current system. The Rosatellum (adopted in 2017) is a mixed electoral system combining proportional representation with a small plurality component. It has created fragmented parliaments requiring lengthy coalition negotiations after elections—sometimes taking weeks or months to form a government. The ruling coalition argues this instability hampers Italy's ability to respond quickly to crises or implement needed reforms. The Bignami-bis aims to replace this with a more decisive system.
How the System Would Work
Under the Bignami-bis framework, Italy would abandon the Rosatellum in favor of a proportional representation model enhanced by a governability prize. Any party or coalition clearing the 42% threshold in both legislative chambers would automatically receive the fixed bonus of 70 additional seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate.
This mechanism aims to prevent the fragmented parliaments and protracted coalition negotiations that have characterized Italian politics for decades. The center-right majority—comprising Fratelli d'Italia, Lega, Forza Italia, and Noi Moderati—argues the reform is essential to ensure clear electoral outcomes and reduce post-election deal-making. By guaranteeing a governing majority to the top-performing coalition, proponents claim the system will deliver the stability Italy needs to pursue long-term economic and institutional reforms.
The 42% barrier represents a compromise within the coalition. Early drafts set the trigger at 40%, but internal negotiations pushed the figure upward to address concerns that too low a threshold could produce outsized parliamentary majorities from a relatively modest vote share. Even at 42%, a winning coalition would command approximately 57% of Chamber seats—a significant amplification of electoral support.
Technical Safeguards and Proportional Backstop
One of the most significant technical innovations in the Bignami-bis text is the introduction of a bicameral consistency requirement. The majority prize will only be awarded if the same coalition or party surpasses the 42% threshold in both the Chamber and Senate. Should results diverge—for instance, if one coalition wins 43% in the Chamber but only 39% in the Senate—the prize mechanism is nullified, and all seats are distributed using strict proportional representation.
This safeguard is designed to prevent a scenario in which different coalitions control the two branches of Parliament, a situation that would paralyze the legislative process and undermine the law's core objective of guaranteeing governability. However, critics note that this fallback effectively creates two possible electoral outcomes: a reinforced majority or a fragmented parliament, with little middle ground.
The elimination of the runoff ballot—originally envisioned if no coalition reached the threshold in a first round—simplifies the process but also removes a mechanism that could have broadened consensus. Without a second round, the prize either triggers at the first vote or the system reverts to proportional distribution, making the 42% bar a decisive all-or-nothing hurdle.
Opposition Pushback and Constitutional Concerns
The proposal has ignited fierce resistance from opposition parties and legal scholars. 145 constitutional law professors have signed a public appeal warning that the system risks violating constitutional principles. Italy's Constitutional Court has twice struck down similar laws in the past: the "Porcellum" (2012) was ruled unconstitutional in 2014 for allocating excessive seats to the winning coalition, and the "Italicum" (2015) was struck down in 2017 for creating an even larger bonus that bore little relationship to actual voter preferences. The court determined both systems excessively distorted the link between votes cast and parliamentary representation.
The Partito Democratico (PD) and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) have labeled the reform "irrecevibile" (unacceptable), arguing it manufactures artificial majorities and undermines democratic representation. PD leaders have accused the ruling coalition of "fear of losing," suggesting the law is designed to entrench power rather than improve governance. The M5S and Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra advocate for pure proportional representation or minimal corrective bonuses that preserve pluralism.
A core complaint centers on blocked party lists, which prevent voters from selecting individual candidates and concentrate power in party leadership. Combined with the majority prize, this structure could create a "premierato di fatto" (de facto premiership system), critics warn, achieving through electoral engineering what the government has struggled to accomplish through direct constitutional reform.
Legal experts caution that even with the 220-222 seat cap, the prize could push a coalition's Chamber share beyond 55%, the threshold the Constitutional Court has historically viewed with suspicion. The court has signaled that excessive bonuses distort representation to an unconstitutional degree, and the Bignami-bis may face judicial review if enacted.
What This Means for Residents' Daily Lives
For Italians, the practical effect of this reform would reshape how policy gets made. Under a system guaranteeing 42% of the vote translates into a commanding majority, governments would have five-year stability—meaning no snap elections, no mid-term coalition collapses, and no sudden policy reversals. For residents, this has concrete implications:
• Healthcare and education: Long-term government stability enables multi-year healthcare and education reform strategies rather than stop-start initiatives derailed by coalition changes. Residents wouldn't see constant shifts in hospital staffing priorities or school funding models.
• Taxation and economic policy: Businesses and households could plan with greater confidence. Tax reforms, pension adjustments, and employment regulations would follow through complete implementation rather than being abandoned by successor governments.
• Immigration and public security: Continuity in immigration processing and police resources means less bureaucratic chaos and more predictable timelines for residents navigating these systems.
• EU compliance and structural reform: Italy's ability to meet European fiscal targets and implement infrastructure projects depends on sustained governmental commitment—something the current fragmented system has repeatedly undermined.
However, the trade-off is a parliament less reflective of the electorate's diversity. Smaller parties and independent movements would find it harder to influence legislation, and voters in regions where minority parties are strong may feel underrepresented. The blocked list system also means citizens lose the ability to express preferences for individual candidates, a feature valued in Italian political culture.
Timeline and Path Forward
Here's what residents need to know about what happens next:
Now (May 2026): The Constitutional Affairs Committee has just completed expert hearings. Deputies are now preparing amendments to the baseline text.
June–July 2026: The ruling majority is targeting first approval vote before the summer recess.
Fall 2026: If both chambers approve, the law would take effect before the 2027 general election.
2027: Voters would cast ballots under the new system for the first time.
Should the reform clear both chambers and survive any constitutional challenge, it would replace the Rosatellum and represent the most significant change to Italy's electoral architecture since the 2017 reforms. The stakes are high: the coalition that designed the system stands to benefit most from it, but any miscalculation in the 42% threshold or legal challenge could unravel the entire project.
What to Watch
For engaged residents planning their political involvement:
• Constitutional Court action: Watch whether opposition forces file a legal challenge immediately after passage. The court's decision could reverse everything.
• Turnout implications: Will voters mobilize differently knowing that 42% guarantees a decade of one-party rule? Historically, this affects smaller parties and protest movements most.
• 2027 electoral dynamics: The first election under these rules will be revealing—expect unprecedented coalition consolidation as parties merge to cross the 42% threshold.
For now, the debate remains intense, with the government pressing forward and opposition forces vowing continued resistance. The coming weeks will reveal whether Italy is headed toward a new era of stable, reinforced majorities—or another chapter in its long history of contested electoral rules.
