The Italian government is positioning itself at the center of a radical shift in European migration policy, one that could fundamentally reshape how the continent handles failed asylum seekers and irregular arrivals. With the European Union's new Returns Regulation now officially in force as of 12 June 2026, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is pushing hard for joint deportation hubs in non-EU countries—an approach that has split the bloc down the middle.
Why This Matters
• Legal Framework Live: The EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force 12 June 2026, allowing member states to detain rejected asylum seekers for up to 30 months and opening the door to offshore processing.
• Funding on the Table: Italy and Germany are lobbying for up to €20 billion over seven years (2028–2034) to be earmarked for "return hubs" in the next EU budget cycle.
• Albania Model Goes EU-Wide: Nineteen EU leaders have signed a letter endorsing the Italy-Albania cooperation as a template, despite its troubled track record.
• France and Spain Opposed: Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez have publicly rejected the hub model, calling it ineffective and incompatible with European values.
The Hawks Circle: 14 Nations Rally Behind Deportation Hubs
Ahead of the latest European Council summit in Brussels, a coalition of 14 member states—led by Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands—convened to coordinate their push for external return centers. The group, which spans political ideologies but shares a hardline stance on migration, emphasized the need to move swiftly from legislative approval to operational projects on the ground.
The Italian Prime Minister described the moment as pivotal. "We need to launch concrete, effective, and replicable pilot projects immediately," Meloni stated, framing the initiative as a logical extension of the new EU rulebook. The coalition's position is backed by a letter signed by 19 EU leaders, which explicitly references the Italy-Albania arrangement as an example of the "innovative solutions" now possible under the revised legal framework.
That framework is substantial. As of mid-June, EU member states can now detain individuals facing deportation orders for up to 24 months, with a potential extension to 30 months in exceptional circumstances—far exceeding the previous Italian cap of 90 days. Crucially, the regulation permits the establishment of detention and processing facilities in third countries outside the EU, provided those nations sign bilateral agreements guaranteeing human rights protections and adherence to the principle of non-refoulement (no returns to unsafe territories).
What the New Rules Mean for Residents
For anyone living in Italy—whether citizen, long-term resident, or temporary visa holder—the shift has tangible implications. The country is expected to become a testing ground for Europe's most aggressive deportation infrastructure, with potential ripple effects on border management, public spending, and diplomatic relations.
Enhanced investigative powers now allow authorities to conduct personal and home searches, seize electronic devices, and impose financial guarantees or electronic monitoring on those awaiting return. While unaccompanied minors are explicitly excluded from offshore transfers, families with children are not, raising questions about enforcement in practice.
For employers and landlords, the expanded detention periods mean greater uncertainty around the status of foreign workers or tenants facing removal orders. And for taxpayers, the stakes are high: Italy's five-year deal with Albania alone is estimated to cost over €650 M, with €252 M allocated just for ministerial staff travel and logistics—before a single deportation flight takes off.
The Albania Experiment: Blueprint or Cautionary Tale?
The Italy-Albania protocol, signed in November 2023 and ratified in February 2024, was designed to externalize asylum screening and deportation holding. Two facilities—one at Shengjin for initial reception, the other at Gjader functioning as a hotspot and detention center—were built under Italian jurisdiction but on Albanian soil, with a combined capacity of roughly 3,000 beds.
By June 2026, however, the centers had processed only around 600 individuals, according to monitoring reports. Legal challenges from Italian and European courts repeatedly blocked transfers, questioning whether the arrangement complies with EU asylum law and fundamental rights protections. Human rights organizations have criticized the lack of transparency, limited access to legal representation, and the ambiguous jurisdictional setup, which leaves external oversight to Albanian authorities while the facilities operate under Italian control.
Despite these setbacks, Meloni has defended the model as pioneering. And at the European level, her gamble appears to be paying off: the new Returns Regulation has effectively validated the concept, prompting several other countries to explore similar partnerships.
Greece has announced plans to finalize the first agreements for offshore hubs in 2026, with facilities operational by 2027. Germany is targeting at least one deal by year-end. Potential host countries under discussion include Rwanda, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, and Montenegro, with a geographic focus on Africa and Eastern Europe.
The Albanian government, meanwhile, has offered mixed signals. Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha has suggested the arrangement may not be renewed beyond 2030, given Albania's aspiration to join the EU by that date—membership would make the current legal structure untenable. Yet Prime Minister Edi Rama has said the protocol will remain "as long as Italy wants it," and recently declared Albania is "closer than ever" to closing accession talks by the end of 2027.
Macron and Sánchez Push Back
Not everyone is convinced. At the close of the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a pointed rebuke. "France does not support the policy of return hubs in third countries," he told reporters, adding that Paris would oppose using the EU budget to fund them. "I have never seen a return center in a third country that actually works," Macron said. "I'm not sure they represent our Europe."
His Spanish counterpart echoed the sentiment. Pedro Sánchez dismissed the hubs as a "mirage" that wastes resources and sends the wrong message to origin and transit countries. "These centers will lead to nothing—they are an absolutely ineffective response, a deception," Sánchez argued. He contrasted the deportation-first approach with Spain's recent regularization of 500,000 migrants already residing in the country, a model rooted in integration rather than exclusion.
Sánchez downplayed reports of a heated clash at the summit. "I wouldn't call it a confrontation. It's a necessary debate taking place in all European capitals," he said. Still, the divide is stark: while 52% of EU citizens support third-country return centers according to a June 2026 poll, the bloc's political leadership remains fractured.
Human Rights Concerns and Legal Hurdles
The Advocate General of the European Court of Justice has ruled that while EU law does not prohibit offshore centers, migrants transferred to them must enjoy equivalent rights and guarantees to those held on European soil. That includes access to legal counsel, judicial review, and protection from arbitrary detention—all of which become significantly harder to enforce beyond EU borders.
Amnesty International and the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) have flagged "excessive and systematic use of administrative detention" in existing European return facilities, along with allegations of physical mistreatment. The IDOS Research Center found that only 43% of detainees in Italian return centers were actually deported in 2024, and EU-wide, just 20% of expulsion orders issued in 2023 resulted in returns.
Extended detention, now permissible for up to two and a half years, raises the stakes for due process failures. Critics warn that the new regulation entrenches a "Fortress Europe" mentality, prioritizing containment over protection.
Budget Battle Ahead
The immediate operational question is financial. Italy and Germany are spearheading an effort to secure dedicated funding for return hubs in the EU's 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework, with estimates suggesting a €20 billion allocation spread over seven years. France's opposition to budgetary support could complicate negotiations, especially if other major contributors align with Macron's position.
For now, the political momentum is with the hawks. The June 2026 regulation provides the legal architecture, the Albania precedent offers a working model (however imperfect), and a cross-party majority of member states is signaling readiness to proceed. Whether that translates into functioning, rights-compliant deportation infrastructure—or a costly diplomatic and humanitarian failure—remains to be seen.
What is certain is that Italy, under Meloni's leadership, has succeeded in making its experiment the focal point of EU migration strategy. The next 18 months will determine whether that influence yields a continental policy shift or a cautionary lesson in the limits of outsourcing asylum obligations.
