Italy's Court System vs. Meloni's Migration Plan: Judges Block Albania Transfers Amid Legal Clash

Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has publicly accused Italian magistrates of blocking deportations to Albania even for irregular migrants convicted of violent crimes, including sexual assault on minors. Speaking before the Senate ahead of an EU Council meeting, Meloni intensified her criticism of judicial rulings that have repeatedly derailed the government's offshore processing plan, asserting that recent court orders lack justification under Italian, European, and international law.

The confrontation centers on a judicial-political clash that has defined Italy's immigration policy since late 2024, when the first migrants were transferred to newly built facilities in Albania. Despite recent European Commission statements affirming that the Italy-Albania protocol is legally compatible with EU standards—provided fundamental rights and asylum norms are respected—Italian judges have systematically overturned detention orders, returning migrants to Italy and, in recent months, ordering the Italian Interior Ministry to pay compensation to a migrant wrongly held at the Gjader facility.

Why This Matters

• Judicial intervention: Italian courts have now required financial damages from the government for the first time over Albania transfers, signaling growing legal exposure.

• Criminal record cases: Migrants with convictions for drug trafficking, sexual assault, and violence against minors have been released from Albanian centers after filing asylum claims, prompting anger from Rome.

• EU legal questions pending: The Court of Cassation referred key issues to the European Court of Justice in recent months, and a Constitutional Court ruling is pending on 48-hour detention procedures for asylum seekers returned from Albania.

The Legal Standoff Over Albania Facilities

The Italy-Albania agreement, signed in November 2023, authorizes the establishment of two Italian-run centers on Albanian soil: a hotspot in Shengjin for initial screening and a Removal Center (CPR) in Gjader for detention pending deportation. Both facilities are financed and operated by Italy's Interior Ministry and designed to house male migrants from designated "safe countries" intercepted at sea.

But operations have been crippled by successive court orders. In November 2024, the Rome Tribunal suspended the detention of the first group of transferred migrants, ordering their immediate return to Italy. Since then, dozens of judicial revocations have followed, often triggered by migrants filing asylum claims—which Italian law and EU directives protect as a fundamental right regardless of criminal record.

Meloni now says that judges have released migrants convicted of crimes ranging from drug dealing and resisting arrest to gang rape and sexual violence against a child, deeming them ineligible for detention or deportation once they claim international protection. She called the decisions "desolate" and insisted the government would continue using all constitutional means to enforce border control and protect public safety.

European Legal Framework in Flux

In recent months, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) dealt a significant blow to the Italian model, ruling that EU member states cannot automatically designate a country as "safe" unless the entire population benefits from protection and unless individual asylum seekers have the opportunity to contest that presumption in court. The judgment directly challenged Italy's accelerated asylum procedures in Albania, which relied on the assumption that migrants from "safe countries" could be fast-tracked for removal.

The CJEU decision invalidated key provisions of Italy's safe-country list, which allowed blanket designations even when certain groups within those countries faced persecution. As a result, the legal basis for holding migrants in Gjader under expedited procedures collapsed, prompting further judicial releases.

Italy responded with Decree-Law 37/2025 (converted to Law 75/2025), which attempted to reframe the Albania centers as standard Removal Centers (CPR) and expand the categories of transferable individuals. Yet the fundamental tension remains: under EU law, anyone who requests asylum must be allowed to do so, and detention for removal is restricted to narrow circumstances that exclude ongoing protection claims.

What This Means for Residents and Policy

For Italians, the standoff has multiple layers of impact. First, it signals ongoing legal uncertainty around the government's flagship deterrence policy, which has already cost hundreds of millions of euros. Second, it raises questions about public safety: the revelation that convicted violent offenders have been released after filing asylum claims—regardless of criminal history—has fueled public anxiety and political pressure.

Third, the financial liability is new. The recent compensation ruling sets a precedent that could expose the state to further damages if more transfers are deemed unlawful. Legal sources note that compensation claims could proliferate if the Constitutional Court or CJEU definitively rules the Albania model incompatible with Italian or EU law.

The government insists it will press ahead. Internal security reports cited by Italian media indicate preparations for acceleration, with plans to bring both centers toward full operational capacity in coming months. However, the SIULP police union has warned of severe operational and safety risks for officers deployed in Albania, where infrastructure remains incomplete and legal mandates remain contested.

Comparative Context: How Europe Handles Convicted Irregular Migrants

To understand Italy's unique approach, it's instructive to examine how other European nations address the challenge of irregular migrants convicted of serious crimes. While the broader European trend is toward stricter detention and expedited removal, Italy's offshore externalization strategy distinguishes it from comparable democracies, most of which rely on expanded onshore detention capacity.

Germany has adopted a policy of immediate deportation for those convicted of violent crimes, terrorism, or sexual offenses. Even migrants born or raised in Germany are subject to removal if convicted of offenses carrying penalties of three years or more. Germany has conducted direct deportations to Afghanistan, including of convicted nationals.

Sweden has toughened its stance dramatically: any offense punishable by more than a fine now triggers a deportation review, and the Supreme Court has ruled that long-term residence or birth in Sweden no longer guarantees immunity from expulsion.

France has streamlined expulsion procedures for foreigners accused of crimes or deemed a security threat. In recent years, tens of thousands of migrants have been held in French detention centers, and the government has considered reintroducing criminal penalties for illegal residency, adding imprisonment to deportation orders.

Spain treats irregular entry as an administrative offense, not a crime, but detains migrants in Immigration Detention Centers (CIE) for up to 60 days to facilitate removal. Spain has focused on deporting those with criminal records while ostensibly protecting vulnerable individuals.

Italy's approach differs fundamentally in its offshore externalization: rather than expand domestic detention capacity as other nations have done, Rome sought to establish processing and removal operations outside EU territory. Yet the legal architecture that supports onshore detention—rooted in decades of ECHR jurisprudence and EU directives—does not easily extend to third countries, even with bilateral agreements. This distinction explains why Italy faces uniquely acute legal challenges compared to its European peers.

The Road Ahead

A major milestone remains pending: the CJEU ruling on questions referred by the Italian Court of Cassation, which will address whether detention in Albania complies with EU Returns Directive and asylum procedure rules. That decision is expected in coming months and could definitively settle whether offshore processing is permissible under current law—or whether Italy must either abandon the model or seek new EU-wide legislation.

Meanwhile, Meloni's government has framed the issue as a defense of popular sovereignty, insisting that voters mandated a crackdown on irregular migration and that judicial overreach threatens democratic accountability. The prime minister has pledged to use "all constitutional powers" to sustain the Albania policy, even as court challenges multiply.

For residents, expats, and investors in Italy, the conflict illustrates a deeper institutional strain: between an elected government pursuing a hard-line immigration agenda and a judiciary enforcing individual rights under Italian and European law. The outcome will shape not only Italy's border management but also the broader European debate over externalization, deterrence, and the limits of asylum law in an era of rising migration pressure.